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Abstract The hope that policy-making is a rational process lies at the heart of policy
science and democratic practice. However, what constitutes rationality is not clear. In
policy deliberations, scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological concerns are often at
odds. Harold Lasswell, in instituting the contemporary policy sciences, found that John
Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy provided an integrative foundation that took into account
all these considerations. As the policy sciences developed with a predominantly empirical
focus on discrete aspects of policy-making, this holistic perspective was lost for a while.
Contemporary theorists are reclaiming pragmatist philosophy as a framework for public
policy and administration. In this article, key postulates of pragmatist philosophy are
transposed to policy science by developing a new theoretical model of transactive ratio-
nality. This model is developed in light of current policy analyses, and against the back-
drop of three classical policy science theories of rationality: linear and bounded
rationalism; incrementalism; and mixed-scanning. Transactive rationality is a ‘‘fourth
approach’’ that, by integrating scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological considerations,
serves as a more holistic, explanatory, and normative guide for public policy and demo-
cratic practice.
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Introduction
People across society would prefer that public policy-making is ‘‘rational’’. Sound rea-
soning should make for well-informed decisions and successful strategies. However, dif-
ferent perspectives proffer conflicting opinions on what constitutes rationality. A
traditional view in public administration is that rationality is a scientific, or technical, mode
of reasoning that is employed to achieve political ends or goals—without questioning the
morality, or worth, of these ends (Meyerson and Banfield 1955; Simon 1983). Increasingly,
policy analysts view this separation of political ends from technical means as a ‘‘moral
disaster’’ in the theory and practice of modern public administration (DeLeon and Lon-
gobardi 2002; Garrison 2000; Richardson 2002). Later theories of public policy and
deliberation explicitly include democratic, moral, and ecological considerations (Alexan-
der 1993; Habermas 1987). There are further divergent challenges to rationality in policy-
making. As Nelkin (1975) indicates: ‘‘The complexity of public decisions seems to require
highly specialized and esoteric knowledge, and those who control this knowledge have
considerable power.’’ Yet, by democratic standards, people have the right to participate in
decisions that affect their lives (Nelkin 1975; Steiner and Alston 2000). Different frames of
reference that are used to evaluate public policy, further exacerbate the tension between
demands for expert knowledge and public participation. Scientific, ideological, economic,
political, procedural, cultural, or ecological frames often produce incompatible recom-
mendations (Durie 2004; Roth et al. 2003). For example, Roth et al. (2003) analyzed public
commentary on proposed Food and Drug Administration regulations in the U.S. and
concluded:
Though scientists and regulatory experts may identify and present scientific evidence
to indicate proposed regulations’ technical rationality, the social problems that these
regulations address may always be reframed in moral terms that undermine the
regulation’s legitimacy. (Roth et al. 2003, p. 36)
In policy science, public administration, and planning, the classic models of rationality
are: linear rationalism (Meyerson and Banfield 1955); bounded rationality (Simon 1957);
incrementalism (Lindblom 1959); and mixed scanning (Etzioni 1967). These models
describe policy processes and offer alternative perspectives on how these processes may be
rationally organized. Other policy theories describe diverse aspects of policy-making based
on empirical analyses, for example, of: agenda setting; policy networks and advocacy
coalitions; policy formulation; and implementation (John 1998; Kingdon 1995; Parsons
1995; Sabatier 1999). This plethora of theoretical and empirical perspectives is not suf-
ficiently integrated to provide an explanatory overview of policy-making, or to serve as a
normative guide for rational public policy. Policy theorists recognize the need for more
holistic, explanatory, and normative policy theory (deHaven-Smith 1988; DeLeon and
Longobardi 2002; John 1998; Parsons 1995; Sabatier 1999). One of the main challenges to
achieving this goal, as deHaven-Smith (1988) asserts in Philosophical Critiques of Policy
Analysis, is that:
The facts confront us like pebbles in a kaleidoscope, capable of being rearranged and
reinterpreted with a twist of the theoretical lens. It is time to discard this fruitless
approach to policy analysis and to explore alternatives grounded in comprehensive
social and political theory. (deHaven-Smith 1988, p. 126)
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This article posits that classical pragmatist philosophy provides a comprehensive
epistemology for the policy sciences. This idea is not new and is, in fact, the foundation on
which the contemporary policy sciences were built. As Harold Lasswell acknowledged:
The policy sciences are a contemporary policy adaptation of the general approach to
public policy that was recommended by John Dewey and his colleagues in the
development of American pragmatism. (Lasswell 1971, p. xiv)
Dewey developed a holistic philosophy that sought to improve rationality in human
agency by integrating the scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological dimensions of rea-
soning. This holistic perspective was lost as policy science developed with a more narrow
technical and empirical focus. There is now growing interest in reclaiming Deweyan prag-
matist philosophy as a comprehensive blueprint for public policy and democratic practice
(Bernstein 1998; Dorstewitz and Kuruvilla 2007; Evans 2000; Joas 1996; Mousavi and
Garrison 2003; Ryan 2000; Shields 2003; Shook 2003; Snider 2000; Westbrook 1991). The
objective of this article is to transpose rationality as envisioned in pragmatist philosophy to
policy science. In order to do this, a new model of rational public policy is developed.
The task of applying classical Deweyan pragmatism to contemporary policy science is
not without its challenges. Consider Dewey’s definition of rationality:
Rationality is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a
working harmony among diverse desires. ‘‘Reason’’ as a noun signifies the happy
cooperation of a multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, exploration,
experimentation, frankness, pursuit—to follow things through—circumspection, to
look about at the context, and so on. The elaborate systems of science are born not of
reason but of impulses at first slight and flickering; impulses to handle, move about, to
hunt, to uncover, to mix things separated and divide things combined, to talk, and to
listen. Method is their effectual organization into continuous dispositions of inquiry,
development, and testing. It occurs after these acts and because of their consequences.
Reason, the rational attitude, is the resulting disposition, not a ready-made antecedent
which can be invoked at will and set into movement. (Dewey 1922/2002, p. 196)
Not only is this a complex, possibly abstruse, explanation, but it also draws on the depth
and breadth of Dewey’s comprehensive and integrative study.1 Pragmatist scholars caution
against a piecemeal reading of pragmatist philosophy and recommend that Dewey’s study
be synthesized and systematized, before application (Caspary 2000; Garrison 2000;
Hickman 2004; Ryan 1995; Schilpp and Hahn 1939/1989; Snider 2000). Four foundational
constructs in pragmatist philosophy are used to build the new model of rationality in this
article. These constructs are presented here as ‘‘postulates’’2:
I. the starting point of rationality is not a predefined problem or goal, but an indeterminate
situation;
1 Dewey wrote over 400 journal articles and 40 books. He also gave a series of public speeches and lectures,
and wrote essays, policy briefs, letters, and articles in popular magazines and newspapers, including in the
New Republic and New York Times. Dewey’s work is now made increasingly accessible through recent
reprints, analyses, anthologies, biographies, and online resources. Notably, the Center for Dewey Studies has
compiled a thirty-seven-volume edition of Dewey’s collected works (1882–1953) that is also available as a
searchable electronic database http://www.siuc.edu/*deweyctr/resources.htm#collection.
2 The term postulate is used here to reflect the fact that much of Dewey’s philosophy is constructed as
inference or argument that he fully intended should be tested and further developed through inquiry and
application. For example, in his theory of ethics, Dewey explicitly refers to ‘‘The Ethical Postulate’’.
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II. rationality is a product of inquiry in democratic communities;
III. rationality integrates scientific, moral, and ecological reasoning; and
IV. rationality is only successful if it serves as a guide towards satisfactory consequences
in both theory and practice.
These postulates are transposed to a new model of rational public policy, the transactive
rationality model, which is presented as a ‘‘fourth approach’’ to linear rationalism,
incrementalism, and mixed-scanning. By integrating scientific, democratic, moral, and
ecological considerations, pragmatist rationality serves as a more holistic, explanatory, and
normative guide for public policy and democratic practice.
Postulate I. The starting point of rationality is not a predefined problem or goal, but
an indeterminate situation
Linear rationality is a primary reference for most other models of rationality, which are
either modifications of this model or explicit rejections of it (Dorstewitz and Kuruvilla
2007; Schoenwandt 2008). The starting point for agency in linear rational models (Fig. 1),
based on Humean psychology, is a pre-defined, given set of ‘‘ends’’ (e.g., ‘‘passions,’’ p,
problems, or goals). These ends are matched with available ‘‘means’’ (e.g., beliefs,
resources, and guides—such as practice standards), which are then implemented to address
or achieve the ends.
In policy theory, linear rationality is reflected in the seemingly ubiquitous ‘‘stages’’
model (Parsons 1995; Sabatier 1999). The stages model depicts policy-making as moving
through distinct steps of policy agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, implemen-
tation, and evaluation. In policy practice, linear rational thinking is evident when public
preferences and political positions are invoked as inviolate guides for future policy pro-
jects. The classic rationality models also explicitly, or implicitly, assume that policy
problems and purposes ‘‘exist’’ outside inquiry and deliberation processes. Bounded
rationality recognizes that there are contextual constraints to coordinating knowledge and
action to maximize given ends. Rationality is then not the development of ultimate or
optimal strategies, but a ‘‘satisficing’’ or ‘‘bounded’’ search for solutions given these
constraints (Simon 1957). Incrementalism rejects the idea of centrally conceived planning,
and instead, describes a continuum of decentralized, incremental changes that demand
frequent review, but that are oriented to some overarching goal (Lindblom 1959). Etzioni
(1967) proposed ‘‘mixed scanning’’ as a ‘‘third approach’’ to Simon’s bounded rationality
and Lindblom’s incrementalism. Mixed scanning is a search process that combines a wide
perspective on potential policy solutions, with an in-depth analysis of the most compelling
options, but what constitutes a policy problem seems unproblematic.
The linear rational model is untenable on empirical, theoretical, and moral grounds. In
practice, public policy problems and goals are rarely well defined at the outset. Analysts
describe insufficiently understood, indeterminate, and ‘‘messy’’ problematic situations as
the starting point of most public planning and policy projects (Checkland 1999; Rosenhead
and Mingers 2001; Shields 2003). In order to counteract the linear stages theory of policy-
Fig. 1 The linear rational model
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making, contemporary theorists provide a vivid assortment of alternative images. These
include: ‘‘the layered formation of a pearl’’ (Weiss 1980); ‘‘cubist paintings’’ and
‘‘mosaics’’ (Shields 1996); ‘‘garbage cans’’ (Cohen et al. 1972); ‘‘concurrent streams of
policy, politics and problems,’’ and ‘‘windows of opportunity’’ (Kingdon 1995).
From a moral perspective, ends and desires that are not subject to inquiry and delib-
eration can be perverse. In order to illustrate this point, Elster (1991) recounts the fable of
Aesop’s fox who, on unsuccessfully trying to reach a desired bunch of grapes, mitigated his
disappointment by deciding that the ‘‘grapes were sour’’. Conversely, the ‘‘grass is greener
on the other side of the fence’’ syndrome is associated with desires that are permanently
beyond reach (Elster 1991). Ends that remain unexamined, because they are considered as
‘‘given,’’ can lead to illogical conclusions and undesirable consequences. If ‘‘given’’ or
unexamined ends can be perverse, then finding ways to gratify them, may neither be in
anyone’s interest, nor a moral exercise according to a wider view of rationality (Richardson
2002).
Indeterminate situations as ‘‘practical starting points’’ in pragmatist philosophy
A century earlier, John Dewey reflected on the indeterminate nature of problematic situ-
ations (Dewey 1910/1997, 1994). He concluded that it was untenable to separate reflection
on strategies and constraints from reflection on related ends and preferences. In pragmatist
philosophy, an indeterminate situation is the ‘‘practical starting point’’ for rational agency
(cf. Hildebrand 1999). In order to establish this alternative starting point for rational
agency (i.e., as opposed to a pre-defined end or passion), Dewey began by explaining how
transactions constitute situations, and how situations turn indeterminate. ‘‘Transaction’’ is
an important, and complex, concept in Dewey’s philosophy, and is foundational to the new
transactive rationality model in this article. This model integrates transactions and rela-
tionships that are formative of rational policy inquiry, deliberation, and change.
All living beings are continually engaged in transactions to maintain, or regain, an
organic equilibrium. Transactions, as active life processes, involve both organism and
environment acting together in a composite unity. Dewey termed this composite transac-
tive unity as a ‘‘situation’’. In any specific functional context, a situation comprises the
diversity and multiple dimensions of related transactions (including biological activity,
social habits, individual thoughts, cultural values, and natural environments) (Dewey 1910/
1997, 1994). In the context of policy-making, Hall (1977) describes policy environments as
comprising institutional, technological, legal, political, economic, demographic, ethical,
ideological, ecological, and cultural dimensions.
Dewey and Bentley (1946) differentiated transaction from self-action (subjects acting
under their own power and volition, as rational choice theories imply) and inter-action
(subjects and objects relating as separate entities, as the behaviorist stimulus-response, or
cause-effect, model suggests). In transaction, there is no ‘‘final attribution to ‘elements’ or
other presumptively detachable or independent ‘entities’’’ (Dewey and Bentley 1946,
p. 509). Classical pragmatist philosophy defines transaction in this specific technical
way. However, the quotidian use of the word conveys a sense that is more like interaction
(i.e., buying and selling, cause and effect). In order to avoid misinterpretation, in this article
the word ‘‘transactive’’ is also used in place of ‘‘transaction,’’ drawing on contemporary
pragmatist scholars’ use of this term. For example, Seigfried (1996, pp. 145–146)
emphasizes that the ‘‘transactive character of experience is its most salient characteristic for
pragmatists. Self and world, thought and action, are reciprocally related.’’
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Transactions and situations in pragmatist philosophy are congruent with ‘‘systems’’
thinking in policy-making and public administration (Ackoff and Emory 2005; Checkland
1999; Vickers 1965). Though parts and actions in a system can be considered indepen-
dently, only together do they constitute a coherent whole. In a systems view, entities are
not defined as static objects, but in terms of their dynamic, functional relations. As Sir
Geoffery Vickers (1978), a progenitor of systems thinking in public administration,
explained in an interview:
Having been a lawyer and an administrator, I am interested in Systems from the
personal up to the very large, human, social systems, I am also interested in systems
of concepts and values through which we see all the others which I call appreciative
systems.
When situations, or systems, comprise regular, functionally coordinated transactions, a
habitual equilibrium is achieved. When habitual equilibrium is interrupted, an indeter-
minate situation results. Intentional transactions, or agency, are then originated and ori-
ented to define the problematic situation, respond, and achieve a new equilibrium (Dewey
1910/1997, 1994). In policy-making, Kingdon (1995) describes an ongoing flow of
activities in politics, problem, and policy streams. At certain points, these streams con-
verge, changing the situation, and creating conditions or opportunities, for policy change.
Agency (or intentional, creative action as opposed to habitual action) forms and evolves
in the attempt to clarify and settle indeterminate situations (Dewey 1939/1989b; Joas 1996;
Mousavi and Garrison 2003). Though human agency develops in response to indeterminate
situations, not all forms of agency are rational. By Dewey’s (1922/2002, p. 192) definition
of rationality, agency requires ‘‘method’’ to evaluate diverse desires, habits, plans of
action, and consequences. The method that Dewey recommends for rational agency is the
Logic of Inquiry presented in a following section. In general, Dewey saw human agency as
a quest to attain new dynamic forms of equilibrium within ever-changing situational
contexts. He viewed human experience as progressing through a continual ‘‘rhythm of
situations’’: from habitual to indeterminate, problematic, and then to new equilibrium
(as depicted in Fig. 2).
In policy theory, Baumgartner and Jones (1991) describe a similar transition between
stability and instability in their punctuated equilibrium model of policy-making. Their
model is critiqued because it does not satisfactorily explain the transition between stability
and change (John 1998). Similarly, incrementalism recognizes that policy change occurs in
Fig. 2 The rhythm of situations
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a continuum of policy activities (Lindblom 1959). Neither of these policy models provides
an explanation of rational agency, which pragmatist philosophy does.
Policy processes never start anew in a vacuum, but occur in a socio-historical contin-
uum. In pragmatist philosophy, a ‘‘practical starting point’’ for rational agency is the
experience of an indeterminate situation within this continuum. Hildebrand (1999) makes a
useful distinction between practical and theoretical starting points. The ‘‘raw experience’’
of an indeterminate situation is not neutral to past experiences, habitual transactions, or
theoretical understanding; indeed it is partly constituted by these. A ‘‘practical starting
point’’ means that a course of inquiry is motivated by the immediate imperatives and
constraints of indeterminate situations, not by abstract, pre-existing theoretical positions.
We start with experience and as it puts us on the spot, we choose different theoretical
frameworks (including of previous policy experiences) as potential tools for creating
meaning and orientation in problematic situations.
In policy-making, indeterminate situations can arise for a variety of institutional,
political, moral, and intellectual reasons (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Kingdon 1995).
Potential policy problems may arise when: political ideologies change (e.g., China
changing from a Marxist to a market economy); research and innovation reveal new
possibilities (e.g., the development of alternative fuel technologies); new targets for policy
processes are developed (e.g., the Millennium Development Goals); there is economic or
social mobilization (e.g., the Orange Revolution in Ukraine); or there are special devel-
opments in policy networks (Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Sabatier 1988).
Not all indeterminate situations become, or should become, public policy problems.
Dewey proposed that the boundaries of the public be ‘‘drawn on the basis of the extent and
scope of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need control, whether by
inhibition or by promotion’’; with public officials and organizations coordinating this
process (Dewey 1954/1927, p. 13). Here, public policy-making is initiated by the need to
manage externalities and promote public goods, rather than by a priori social roles or
contracts. The latter approach is propagated in early theories of liberalism and in later
theories of social justice (Dewey 1939/1989a, 1954/1927). Sometimes, even though
indeterminate situations have public policy implications they may be systematically kept
off policy agendas. Classic policy case studies on ‘‘non decision-making’’ show, for
example, how the topic of air pollution was kept off local policy agendas when companies
that were major polluters were also major employers in these locations (Bachrach and
Baratz 1962; Crenson 1971).
The rhythm of situations as a template for the transactive rationality model
The rhythm of situations provides a template for the transactive rationality model, as
depicted in Fig. 3. This model takes both a descriptive and a normative stance.
The transactive rationality model provides an account of the typical elements in policy-
making and the related challenges and dynamics. At the same time, the model incorporates
Dewey’s method of ‘‘inquiry’’ (described in a later section), as a rational way to organize
policy processes toward the successful resolution of problematic situations. Each element
of the model is discussed with reference to the pragmatist postulate to which it relates. The
second pragmatist postulate relates to the formation of rational agency through commu-
nities of inquiry.
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Postulate II. Rationality is a product of inquiry in democratic communities
Most theories of rationality wrongly assume that there is a pre-existing ‘‘agent,’’ or an
independent entity with predefined preferences and motivations for action (Joas 1996;
Mousavi and Garrison 2003). From a pragmatist perspective neither an agent nor an
agent’s preferences are pre-determined. For Dewey the ‘‘actor’’ (i.e., the locus and author
of agency) is a ‘‘confused and confusing word. … ‘Actor’ should always be taken as
postulationally transactional, and thus as a trans-actor’’ (Dewey 1925–1953/1999, p. LW
16.260). From this transactive view, Dewey (1954/1927) and Mead (1913/1982) explained
that neither the individual nor society can be considered in isolation; individuals and
societies are mutually constitutive through ongoing transactions in communities. Dewey
held a position, aligned with Jefferson’s, that the ‘‘community’’ was the foundation of
democratic practice:
Unless local communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its
most urgent problem, to find and identify itself. (Dewey 1954/1927, p. 216)
Dewey recognized that communities are not built on physically contiguity alone, as they
also have a functional basis. In fact, Dewey foresaw that ‘‘to a very considerable extent,
groups having a functional basis will probably have to replace those based on physical
contiguity’’ (Dewey 1939/1989a, p. 123). Dewey’s theory of communities of inquiry was
developed and tested in practice through his extensive collaboration with Jane Addams on
a range of social policy projects, including on progressive education and on settlement
projects at the Hull House (Shields 2003).
Fig. 3 The transactive rationality model
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In order to resolve indeterminate situations, agency develops through individuals and
groups forming ‘‘communities of inquiry’’ (Dewey 1954/1927; Shields 2003). Policy
scientists similarly describe networks, advocacy coalitions, and policy subsystems that
form around policy issues (Heclo 1978; Sabatier 1988). These are groups that share ‘‘basic
values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions—and who show a non-trivial degree
of coordinated activity over time’’ (Sabatier 1988). Sabatier (1988) describes how advo-
cacy coalitions that form around policy issues such as air pollution control are constituted
by public sector organizations, congressional committees, corporations, special interest
groups, journalists, and research institutes for whom this issue is relevant.
In the transactive rationality model (Fig. 3), ‘‘communities of inquiry’’ form a dynamic
boundary around an indeterminate situation and determine and demarcate a policy prob-
lem. This demarcation distinguishes activities relevant to defining and resolving the
indeterminate situation, from the habitual transactions occurring externally (Dewey 1954/
1927; Shields 2003). In the transactive rationality model, communities of inquiry have
three key characteristics: participation; pluralism; and power.
In considering participation in policy-making, the ultimate goal is not to have everyone
participating all the time, as this would be impracticable, inefficient, and ineffective
(Benhabib 1986; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Habermas 1987; Shook 2004). Dewey strongly
recommended that, in coordinating democratic inquiry, publics be identified on a func-
tional basis determined by who, and what, is required to resolve problematic policy situ-
ation (Dewey 1954/1927; Shields 2003; Shook 2004). For those coordinating public policy
processes, stakeholder analysis methods can help identify relevant actors, their interests,
and positions to the policy issue being considered (Brugha and Varvasovsky 2000; Reich
1996). These considerations may change throughout the policy process, so the boundaries
of the transactive rationality model are (and should be) flexible and permeable to ongoing
changes in policy networks and problematic situation.
Pluralism is an important consideration in the constitution of communities of inquiry.
Individuals define themselves, and the communities they form, differently with respect to
different problematic situations. A scientist may be an expert on one topic and a lay person
on another. Someone may be the beneficiary of one policy option and stand to lose with
another option. Scholars recognize that paying attention to a diverse range of socio-cultural
practices, perspectives, and choices is more useful from a political and legal perspective,
than the focus on singular ‘‘identities,’’ such as gender, race, or religious affiliation
(Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000; Sen 2006). Dewey emphasized that pluralism is not only
a reality, but also an intellectual resource on which societies should draw to resolve
problematic situations (Dewey 1954/1927). Dewey proposed two criteria for assessing
‘‘social intelligence’’: (i) the level of pluralism in a society’s intellectual resources and (ii)
the extent to which these pluralistic resources are freely available for inquiry to resolve
problematic situations (Dewey 1954/1927). In emphasizing the importance of pluralistic
intellectual resources, Dewey cautioned against the search for panaceas, using the example
of inquiry into health:
Health is a comprehensive, a ‘‘sweeping’’ ideal. However, progress toward it has
been made in the degree in which recourse to panaceas has been abandoned and
inquiry has been directed to determinate disturbances and means for dealing with
them. (Dewey 1939/1989a, p. 129)
Dewey did not see why this type of inquiry into specific problems should not extend to
socio-political and economic research, rather than the continual quests for political pan-
aceas: capitalism, socialism, laissez faire individualism, and so on.
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Several theories of public deliberation focus on power as a primary force, whether
positive or negative (Foucault 1984; Habermas 1987; Lukes 1974). Dewey observed that
power is usually seen as a constructive force in oneself, but as a negative force in others
(Dewey 1922/2002). He posited that developing reliable methods of public inquiry and
deliberation could obviate the use of power as brute force. Similarly, based on his analyses
of social policy-making internationally, Heclo (1974) points out the general, misplaced,
tendency to overestimate the role of power, and underestimate the role of inquiry and
deliberation.
In the transactive rationality model, power delimits participation and shapes all the
decision activities, but carries no commitment to centralized or hierarchical forms of power.
On the contrary, power as an element of the transactive model boundary is more a reminder
that all the individuals and groups involved in the activities of ‘‘Define,’’ ‘‘Design,’’
‘‘Realize,’’ and ‘‘Deliberate,’’ and in surrounding policy environments, can all potentially
shape inquiry, and contribute to defining and resolving problematic policy situations.
However, the challenges faced by public policy institutions to facilitate pluralistic partic-
ipation, and to constructively channel power, cannot be underestimated. Related critiques
are extensively documented in the literature, and research on improving methods of par-
ticipation and deliberation is evolving (Benhabib 1986; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Habermas
1987; Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Isaacs 1999).
With communities of inquiry forming the basis of rational agency, the oft-cited chasm
between scientific expertise and democratic participation is not unbridgeable. In fact,
Dewey saw a clear connection between democracy and science. Ryan (1995) explains
this link:
Dewey thought of democratic processes as a search procedure in which we look for
policies, laws, and administrative techniques that will allow us to continue a common
life in a way that all of us can find fruitful and fulfilling … The nearest he got to a
single account of democracy’s virtues was that they were similar to those of science:
It excluded the fewest alternatives, allowed all ideas a fair shot at being tried out,
encouraged progress, and did not rely on authority. (Ryan 1995, pp. 313–314)
Postulate III. Rationality integrates scientific, moral, and ecological reasoning
Dewey’s approach to democratic and scientific inquiry owes much to Charles Sanders
Peirce’s3 ‘‘Doubt-Belief’’ scheme. Peirce (1831–1958)4 defined inquiry as a collective
social enterprise that aims to settle ‘‘doubt.’’ Contrary to the Cartesian model of inquiry, in
classical pragmatism ‘‘doubt’’ is more than the theoretical possibility of calling a propo-
sition into question or generating a hypothesis. ‘‘Doubt’’ is an existential state, a crisis of
belief that challenges previously successful, or functional, knowledge and methods.
Peirce’s position was that doubt, just as belief, needs good reasons (Peirce 1931–1935).
Joas (1993) explains the role of doubt in pragmatist inquiry:
Doubt becomes necessary only when well-established certainties no longer stand the
test of reality or when subjects raise objections to the certainties of other subjects.
3 Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey are considered the founding triumvirate of
classical pragmatist philosophy. Jane Addams and George Herbert Mead, with whom Dewey worked
closely, were also key to the development of classical pragmatism.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Peirce refer to this collection of his study.
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The purpose of this doubt is to bring about new certainties through creative problem
solving. (Joas 1993, p. 61)
Scientific inquiry takes place in a universe that is partly indeterminate, and abidingly
suspended in the process of its own creation. Knowledge and laws are neither exact nor
immutable; they are fallible and, at best, probabilistic. Human knowledge has moved
beyond the thinking in the Middle Ages that the world is flat.5 Medical science now relies
on anatomy and physiology rather than on the ‘‘humors’’ of medieval medicine (Foucault
1973/1963). There are also contemporary knowledge shifts, for example, when the harmful
effects of currently approved medicines become evident in the longer-term, necessitating
knowledge and policy change.
Putnam and Conant (1995, p. 152) highlights the unique contribution that pragmatist
philosophy makes by integrating antiscepticism, wherein doubt requires as much justifi-
cation as belief, and fallibilism, wherein there is no metaphysical guarantee that any belief
is forever above revision. In the commitment to fallibilism as a source of scientific and
political improvement, Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and Popper’s philosophy of science
(1945, 1959) are aligned. However, in contrast to Popper’s piece-meal perspective on
societal change, and to Lindblom’s (1959) view of decentralized, incremental policy
change, Dewey offers a vision of the public as a ‘‘great community’’ where people can
envision and engage in large-scale social projects (Ryan 1995, pp. 100–101). Hickman
explains: ‘‘Dewey argues instead for evolutionary continuities and for a commonality
among human beings that is supported by those shared developments…that include
communication and that provide the basis for objective tests of putative goods’’ (Hickman
2004, p. 497).
Dewey saw indeterminate policy situations arising as much from thinking about, and
imagining future situations, as from more explicit, immediate changes in policy environ-
ments (Dewey 1929/1999, p. LW.4.182). For example, disruptions in policy equilibrium
can occur from thinking about the implications of climate change for future generations, or
about the challenges to pension and social security systems as a result of changing pop-
ulation demographics. The transactive rationality model embraces Dewey’s method of
inquiry and the ‘‘scientific attitude’’ (Dewey 1920/1999, p. 228; Shields 2003). A prag-
matist policy-maker thus would not only seek to remedy symptoms of failure after they
occur, but would also proactively and creatively think about solutions to avoid future
impasses and to facilitate innovation, progress, and flourishing. Rather than settling for
‘‘muddling through,’’ rummaging through ‘‘garbage cans’’ or being led by an ‘‘invisible
hand,’’ pragmatism proposes a more forward-looking approach of ‘‘socially intelligent
inquiry.’’ Dewey recommended that the scientific attitude be cultivated in societies, and
even delighted in, to be open to the realities and possibilities of change (Dewey 1920/1999;
Shields 2003).
The actions employed to resolve problematic situations result in learning, and thus
shape self and society. Deliberation on societal choices and consequences is, hence, a
fundamentally moral activity, and cannot be limited to a utilitarian or mathematical cost–
benefit analysis. As Dewey cautioned:
Deliberation is then not to be identified with calculation, or a quasi-mathematical
reckoning of profit and loss. Such calculation assumes that the nature of the self does
5 Notwithstanding Thomas Friedman’s 2005 book, The World is Flat, which proposes that globalization is a
flattening factor.
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not enter into the question … Every choice sustains a double relation to the self. It
reveals the existing self and it forms the future self. (Dewey 1994, p. 141)
Traditionally in policy science, rationality models do not take morality into account.
Political goals and public preferences are not evaluated as these are generally taken as
fixed or given. As Herbert Simon averred:
Reason is wholly instrumental. It cannot tell us where to go; at best it can tell us how
to get there. It is a gun for hire that can be employed in the service of any goals we
have, good or bad. (Simon 1983, pp. 7–8)
Analyses of this ‘‘amoral’’ approach to rational decision-making in the Vietnam War,
highlight the associated dangers, both moral and strategic (DeLeon and Longobardi 2002;
Garrison 2000; Richardson 2002). The extensive technical calculations and mathematical
modeling failed to take into account critical moral and cultural considerations. These,
however, were among the main reasons for the worldwide protests and U.S. failures in this
war (DeLeon 1988). Aligned with this critical thinking, in 2009, President Obama spoke
out against torture as a means to ensure national security, as this contravened the core
values and very identity of the nation established in the U.S. Constitution:
I know that we must never, ever, turn our back on its enduring principles for
expedience sake. I make this claim not simply as a matter of idealism. We uphold our
most cherished values not only because doing so is right, but because it strengthens
our country and it keeps us safe. (White House Briefing 2009)6
Hence, how does pragmatist philosophy address morality with respect to rationality?
There are strident criticisms of Dewey because he does not provide a substantive moral
standard (Ryan 1995; Schilpp and Hahn 1939/1989). Dewey (1939/1989b), however, did
not think that philosophers should set moral standards for the rest of society. Instead, he
proposed that by improving methods of rational inquiry and deliberation, certain moral
principles would emerge through societies’ efforts to coordinate collective action, resolve
problematic situations, and promote learning and flourishing. Thereafter, compelling rea-
sons would be required to doubt these evolutionary moral precepts (as doubt, just as belief,
requires warrant). This approach strengthens our moral principles against the onslaught of
an all-encompassing skepticism, without falling prey to the trap of trying to settle moral
questions once and for all (without the option of sensible review and application in specific
cases and changing circumstances). As with scientific inquiry, in pragmatist philosophy,
the balance between fallibilism and antiskepticism is the basis for moral inquiry and
learning (Dewey and Tufts 1908/1999). The evolution of international human rights law
illustrates this process.
Human rights were not explicitly referred to until the Scientific Enlightenment in the
seventeenth century (Edmundson 2004). Dewey (1919/1999) noted this as a correspon-
dence, or coincidence: ‘‘There has been, roughly speaking, a coincidence in the devel-
opment of modern experimental science and of democracy.’’ Monarchy and religious
orthodoxy were rejected for every individual’s dignity and access to knowledge. In the
centuries after the Enlightenment and through the French Revolution, the American
Declaration of Independence, World War II, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, human rights thinking evolved, entered the lingua franca of global politics, and
became codified in international law (Edmundson 2004; Steiner and Alston 2000). Human
6 White House Briefing, May 21, 2009 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Security-and-Values/).
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rights standards may make demands beyond what is immediately expedient. Nevertheless,
these general principles provide an agreed-upon foundation for directing long-term social
coordination and for developing shared practices that are valued by individuals and
societies across the world. There are ongoing disagreements on the application of human
right standards to specific problematic situations. From the pragmatist perspective, human
right standards can, and should, be tested and evolve in this way.
In order to guide moral inquiry, Dewey put forward an Ethical Postulate that he hoped
individuals and societies would test in different problematic situations.
The conduct required truly to express an agent is, at the same time, the conduct
required to maintain the situation in which he is placed: while, conversely, the
conduct that truly makes the situation is that which furthers the agent. … The
postulate is verified by being acted upon. The proof is experimental. (Dewey 1897/
1999, p. 234)
Westbrook (1991) highlights a significant progression in Dewey’s study in the evolution
of this Ethical Postulate. An earlier version this postulate maintained was that we must not
see individual good and social welfare as competing moral ends because personal benefit
and the common good are complementary and essentially depend on one another. This
later version extends this thinking to a more ecological focus on ‘‘situations’’ as a whole.
Here Dewey maintains that not only are the individual and the social good mutually
dependent, but also that human beings are part of interdependent systems, or situations, in
nature. Thus, how natural resources are used, the extent to which this use is sustainable,
and the interdependencies of ecologies and human experience, are key considerations in
the pragmatist approach to rationality (Alexander 2002; Dorstewitz and Kuruvilla 2007).
The logic of inquiry as the method for rational agency
By Dewey’s (1922/2002, p. 192) definition, agency requires ‘‘method’’ to be rational. In
order to develop this method, Dewey analyzed different types of inquiry used in scientific
experiment, common sense, mathematical logic, and even musical composition, to review:
‘‘specific sorts of inquiry and reach a generalized account of knowing through analyses of
the features they present’’ (Dewey 1939/1989b, p. 557). Dewey defined inquiry as follows:
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into
one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the
elements of the original situation into a unified whole. (Dewey 1938/1999, p. 117)
Five main elements constitute the logic of inquiry:
i. Indeterminate situations are experienced where harmonious, habitual, and functional
interaction is interrupted or challenged, stimulating intentional action.
ii. Institution or intellectualization of a problem refers to the process of modifying an
indeterminate situation into a ‘‘problematic’’ situation, where the issue is framed in a
way that allows it to be addressed.
iii. The determination of problem-solutions gives new meaning to the expression that ‘‘a
problem well-put is half-solved’’ (Dewey 1939/1989b). A problem is formulated with
respect to possible solutions or hypotheses. The concepts of having a problem and
finding a solution are interrelated and mutually constitutive.
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iv. Deliberation and judgment are not only analogous to the process of testing
hypotheses, but also includes deliberation and judgment on intentions, potential
consequences, norms, and moral orientation. Shared purposes can be developed
through reflection or imagination of solutions and their consequences, leading to
commitments on action to resolve problematic situations.
v. Restoration of harmonious experience occurs when inquiry manages to systematically
harmonize conceptions with experience, resolve problematic experience, and regain
equilibrium and functional coordination.
Pragmatist scholars caution against interpreting Dewey’s logic of inquiry as a method of
scientific experiment (Hickman 1995; Manicas 2002). The term ‘‘experimental’’ does not
capture Dewey’s integrated view of what is ‘‘experiential,’’ i.e., the mutually formative
transactions of agents and conditions in situations. Dewey was also explicit on the dis-
tinctions between the methods and objectives of pragmatism and empiricism:
Pragmatism is an extension of historical empiricism with this fundamental difference
that it does not insist on antecedent phenomena, but on consequent phenomena, not
upon precedents, but upon the possibilities of action—and this change in point of
view is almost revolutionary in its consequences. An empiricism which is content
with repeating facts already past has no place for possibility and for liberty. (Dewey
1925/1999, p. LW.2.13)
Based on Dewey’s logic of inquiry, the internal structure of the transactive rationality
model is constituted by four activities: Define, Design, Realize, and Deliberate. These
activities could be read in a linear fashion, for example, following a sequence of
Define ? Design ? Deliberate ? Realize. The activities could also take place concur-
rently, separately, or iteratively, and they all influence each other. The fluid, permeable
nature of the internal divisions of the transactive rationality model, and the ongoing
interaction between the ‘‘decision cell’’ and the policy environment further inhibits a linear
reading of the model. All activities are considered formative in policy-making. This model
thus does not pivot around a central point at which strategic decisions are taken. The
transactive rationality model eschews the linear instrumental separation between intel-
lectual and practical phases (i.e., between planning and implementation). The idea behind a
circular ordering of these activities is to acknowledge, and encourage, transactions in any
direction and at any stage of the process. The distinctions made between the different
decision activities are of a heuristic nature, as will be discussed in the following sections.
Define
Many traditional rationalistic policy models have problem identification stages where
given problems, interests, and policy agendas are negotiated. In the pragmatist view, in
response to an indeterminate situation, a situation is explored and problems defined (rather
than identified). Once an indeterminate situation is defined as problematic situation that
requires a public policy intervention (as discussed under the section on communities of
inquiry), suggestions are developed for what Dewey calls ‘‘problem-solutions’’ (Dewey
1938/1999). Problems and solutions are not separate, distinct categories. A particular
definition of a situation is concomitant with a particular solution. In the development of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, analyses show the issue of access for disabled people to
public spaces and buildings had at least two alternative policy frames or definitions: as a
276 Policy Sci (2010) 43:263–287
123
transport issue and as an anti-discrimination issue (Kingdon 1995; Richardson 2002). Each
definition had very different policy implications and consequences, i.e., to provide special
modes of transport, or to ensure the social integration of people with disabilities by
modifying public spaces and transportation, which reflected the values of the civil rights
movement at the time. Ultimately, it was a combination of the two approaches that
resulted—a policy ‘‘end’’ that was not initially conceived.
The emphasis in the mode of define is on developing an understanding of indeterminate
situations and exploring ways of resolving them. This is a mode where brainstorming,
empirical and epidemiological analysis, concept development, narratives, and the arts all
have application. Specific techniques, such as ‘‘problem-structuring methods,’’ have been
developed to systematically work through the process of defining problematic situations
and possible solutions (Rosenhead and Mingers 2001).
Design
Influenced by the ‘‘problem-solutions’’ developed during the define phase, design is an
activity where possible resolutions of indeterminate situations are explored and evaluated.
Analyzing the available evidence, developing technical models and operational strategies,
including allocation of resources and roles, assessing constraints and feasibility, and for-
mulating related policy options are all part of the design phase.
Design is probably the most technical or ‘‘formal’’ phase in policy-making. Dewey’s
approach to socially intelligent inquiry recommends drawing on a range of pluralistic
resources in society to resolve problematic situations and further recognizes that there are
diverse dimensions and definitions possible in any situation. Dewey did see a specific, but
not ‘‘privileged,’’ role for scientific expertise in policymaking, that lay not in ‘‘framing and
executing policies, but in discovering and making known the facts, upon which the former
depend,’’ as well as in carrying out specific technical functions as part of a larger com-
munity of inquiry working to resolve a problematic situation (Dewey 1954/1927).
‘‘Technical’’ here refers to the idea that experts and scientists have the skills to organize the
facts to inform policy deliberations, not that experts should design and decide policy on
their own. Part of the policy design process is facilitating public valuation of possible
solutions. Public commentary on proposed policies is, for example, a required component
of federal rule making in the U.S. and other countries. As illustrated in earlier cited
examples of the Vietnam War protests (DeLeon 1988) and public commentary on FDA
regulations (Roth et al. 2003), moral framing of policy issues can ‘‘trump’’ technical and
economic frames.
The products of design activity often take the form of technical, legal or policy doc-
uments, for example technical specifications and guidelines, operational or strategic
models and scenarios, budgets, bills, treaties, legal contracts, policy directives and
guidelines, and public commentary (Buse et al. 2005; Lomas 1990). At this stage, agreed
upon principles and plans of action are widely communicated to develop a shared vision of
the proposed policy. Architects effectively communicate such overarching plans and
visions, not by means of complicated formulae or technical details but with a ‘‘blue print’’
that clients can comment on, and based on which different groups can visualize their
individual roles within the entire picture.7
7 c.f. R. L. Ackoff (2007) How to avoid the fatal F-Laws: Global Business, an interview with Peter Day.
BBC World Service.
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Deliberate: conflict, imagination, and norms
In order to resolve indeterminate policy situations, individuals and groups may engage in a
cooperative process of inquiry and deliberation, or engage in a more adversarial process.
Several parliamentary systems are based on an adversarial system of political deliberation.
Experts can, and do, interpret evidence differently and, indeed, use evidence to lobby for
different policies and interests, or to support different positions, as in a court of law (Irwin
2001; Longino 2002; Salwen and Stacks 1996; Smith and Wynne 1989). However, lessons
learned in the Greek polis and in contemporary studies on deliberation in policy networks,
indicate that confrontation inhibits the development of new ideas, knowledge, and progress
(Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Isaacs 1999). Dewey acknowledged the ubiquity of conflict in
problematic situations and explained that deliberation was required to understand and
resolve these conflicts:
Conflict is acute… Deliberation is not an attempt to do away with this opposition…
It is an attempt to uncover the conflict in its full scope and bearing. (Dewey 1922/
2002, p. 216)
Improved methods of negotiation, conflict resolution, and consensus development can
facilitate non-confrontational deliberation and support collaborative action to resolve
problematic policy situations (Drager et al. 2000; Hutchings et al. 2006; Isaacs 1999).
Dewey defines deliberation as ‘‘a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various com-
peting possible lines of action’’ (Dewey 1922/2002, p. 190). Dewey viewed both intelli-
gence and imagination as the ability ‘‘to see the actual in the light of the possible’’
(Alexander 1993, p. 384). In science, imagination plays a role in discoveries and
‘‘breakthroughs.’’ Through imagination artists explore and communicate ‘‘those potencies
in things by which an experience—any experience—has significance and value’’ (Dewey
1934/1980, p. 192). In policy-making, imagination facilitates ‘‘safe’’ exploration and
deliberation on alternative plans of action and their consequences and thus helps prevent
premature commitment to any one option.
One method that supports the use of imagination and dramatic rehearsal in policy-
making is scenario development. Scenario development is identified as ‘‘good practice’’ for
developing forward-looking and innovative policies, and for anticipating and managing
policy change (Cabinet Office 1999). Scenario development is used in a range of policy
contexts: for example, in climate change deliberations (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) and in
considering alternative scenarios for health care reform (Wanless 2002). In scenario
development, a set of plausible ‘‘futures’’ is described using a matrix of alternative sce-
narios (Koehler and Harvey 2004). The implications of these scenarios, the indicators that
one or the other scenario may be playing out, and contingency plans to meet related
opportunities and risks are also considered.
In anticipating change, established norms are relatively stable guides across different
situations. In policy-making, Sabatier discusses three overlapping levels of norms: (i)
ideologies and deep core beliefs; (ii) basic political values or strategies; (iii) specific policy
measures (Sabatier 1988). Though specific policy measures may be relatively open to
negotiation and change, change becomes increasingly difficult when moving up this
typology of norms. Changing core ideologies may be as complicated as effecting religious
conversions.
Pragmatist philosophy portrays norms and ideals as useful points of orientation in the
choppy sea of changing situations. However, unlike in other schools of philosophy, in
pragmatism, norms and ideals should not be considered as ultimate standards or goals:
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True ideals are the working hypothesis of action; they are the best comprehension we
can get of the value of our acts … not that they set up remote goals. Ideals are like
stars; we steer by them not towards them. (Dewey 1897/1999, p. EW.4.262)
The pragmatist paradox is the following: How can norms and ideals serve as reliable
orientation points if they must be flexible enough to address the demands of changing
situations? In pragmatist inquiry, norms are considered ‘‘intellectual instruments to be
tested and confirmed—and altered—through consequences effected by acting upon them’’
(Dewey 1929/1999, p. LW.4.221). Despite their relative stability as the products of an
evolving social learning process, norms will always require interpretation and application
in specific problematic situations (Alexander 1993; Dewey and Tufts 1908/1999). This
concept is played out in legal systems where established laws have to be interpreted and
applied. If existing laws do not clarify and resolve problematic situations, they can be
revised, but only through a rigorous process of inquiry and deliberation.
Realize
Realize, as the term suggests, incorporates elements of ‘‘putting into practice,’’ ‘‘evaluat-
ing,’’ and ‘‘learning.’’ This activity is in line with the pragmatist concept of change wherein
any effected change in a situation is concomitant with changed experience in that situation
(Dewey 1938/1999). This breaks down the linear sequence between (1) ‘‘implementing
change’’; (2) ‘‘learning from experience’’; (3) ‘‘changing dispositions and actions.’’
‘‘Learning by doing’’ is an insufficient concept to sum up this interrelationship between
experience, learning, and change. In the pragmatist model, realize extends to the overall
process of restoring harmonious experience and equilibrium through changes in the overall
situation comprising agents, environments, and transactions. The implication is that the
implementation of any change amounts to a transformation of the way agents act. The
process of ‘‘realizing’’ comprises what organizational change theorists Argyris and Scho¨n’s
termed ‘‘double loop learning’’ (Argyris and Scho¨n 1978). In this type of learning process,
mutually influencing changes occur in actors’ knowledge and values as well as in their
organizational or policy environments.
Classic studies of policy implementation show that ongoing, discretionary decision
making by bureaucrats and managers at ‘‘street-level’’ is inevitable, and even desirable, in
the implementation and administration of policies and programs (Lipsky 1976; Pressman
and Wildavsky 1984). As Garrison (2000, p. 473) comments:
Astute administrators see their ends clearly and revise them as necessary; only a fool
would bypass a greater good merely to execute the original plan, although that is
what linear, detached instrumentalism will often require the administrator to do.
However, discretionary decisions can render policies and programs unrecognizable
from their planned formulation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). Further, these discre-
tionary, implementation-related changes come about in an autocratic, undemocratic, or
arbitrary manner (Richardson 2002). In order to improve the rationality of public policy-
making, the process by which ‘‘ends’’ and ‘‘means’’ are revised should also be a scientific,
democratic, and moral process. The permeable and variable boundaries of the transactive
rationality model recognize that decision making is ongoing throughout the process of
policy-making.
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Activities in the realize mode include the implementation of agreed upon policies, and
developing or revising evaluation criteria and methods (an element that most models of
rational deliberation see as part of earlier definition phases). Failure to realize hypothesized
effects or to meet agreed upon benchmarks would require changes to be made to the
original plans. These changes can be achieved through a coordinated process of policy
inquiry involving deliberation and changes in define or design activities, or in the com-
position of communities of inquiry.
Transactive change, accountability, and learning
The fluid boundaries of the transactive model depicts that structural change in agents and
environments occurs through ongoing transactions. Darwin’s evolution of species is a good
example with which to study change from a transactive perspective (Dewey 1910/1997;
Hickman 2004). Yet, Dewey presents the transactive formation of agency and change as
more than just a product of evolutionary chance. He distinguished between three categories
of active and creative change that agents intentionally employ to resolve problematic
experiences and to restore equilibrium (Dewey 1934; Joas 1996).
• Adaptation involves altering the external environment to match the agent’s needs (e.g.,
preventing diseases by building sanitation and hygiene facilities).
• Accommodation, is internally oriented and involves an alteration within the agent.
Agents rethink a situation and learn to maintain and develop functional transactions
when conditions or circumstances cannot be changed (e.g., learning to live with a
chronic disease or a seemingly intractable policy problem).
• Adjustment or transformative change refers to a more complex situational change
where, through mutually referential transactions, both agents and environments change
(e.g., the evolution of a species with changes in both the species and its environment, or
changes in policy organizations and policy contexts that are mutually referential). This
type of systemic change is aligned with theories of organizational change such as
Argyris and Scho¨n’s concept of ‘‘double loop learning’’ (Argyris and Scho¨n 1978) and
with Vickers’ concept of change in ‘‘appreciative systems’’ of policy-making (Vickers
1965).
The objectives of change, in the pragmatist view, are to regain functional coordination
and equilibrium, and to promote learning and flourishing. Transactive change results in a
new dynamic equilibrium and in new learning and transactions. These transactions become
habitual, and are then challenged anew in the ongoing rhythm of situations.
One of the main challenges of a transactive, participatory model of policy-making is
locating authority and accountability. Weiss analyzes the reasons why roles and respon-
sibilities in public policy-making are difficult to pin down:
Three conditions that mainly account for the disavowals of decision-making
authority [are]: (1) the dispersion of responsibility over many offices and the par-
ticipation of many actors in decision-making, so that no one individual feels that he
or she has a major say; (2) the division of authority among federal, state, and local
levels in the federal system; and (3) the series of gradual and amorphous steps
through which many decisions take shape. (Weiss 1980, p. 399)
Accountability is a focus of much policy and governance research and practice. In
Norway, the ministry of health developed an accountability matrix approach to explicitly
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define accountability relationships in health systems management and to assess perfor-
mance (WHO 2007). A better understanding of policy-making, and making explicit the
actors, conditions, and criteria involved in rational decision-making, could help partici-
pants in policy processes better understand their respective roles, responsibilities, and
related accountabilities.
This section concludes the development of the transactive rationality model and illus-
trates how a pragmatist reconstruction of rationality can be transposed to a theory of
policy-making. Based on pragmatist philosophy, this model integrates the democratic,
scientific, ecological, and moral dimensions of rational agency that can be used to resolve
problematic situations, and support individual and societal flourishing.
Postulate IV. Rationality is only successful if it serves as a guide towards satisfactory
consequences in both theory and practice
The pragmatist criteria for the success of rational policy-making are usefully considered in
light of the differences between classical Deweyan pragmatism and Rortyian neo-prag-
matism.8 Neo pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty venerated Dewey, partly, because of
their mutual rejection of reality as something externally fixed and given, with experience
serving as a mere receptacle for nature’s spectacle. In the same way as Dewey, Rorty
(1980) explains that epistemic processes are active in creating both our beliefs and the
objects of our belief.
Rorty parts company with Dewey when it comes to Dewey’s definition of experience as
a natural process that is ‘‘existential’’ or ‘‘real,’’ and inquiry as an ongoing quest within the
context of experience (cf. Hildebrand 2005). Rorty declared that all attempts to define
‘‘objective’’ criteria for the success of rationality or scientific common sense are made in
vain. He advised the scientific community to abandon the pointless quest for truth and
objectivity. Where empiricists saw experience to be an external and impartial judge of
theory and inquiry (a position rejected by Dewey), Rorty saw references to experience as
constructs developed through deliberations in specific conversations or contexts, which had
established rules or standards.
Both Peirce and Dewey would have disavowed this reduction of inquiry and deliber-
ation to a parlor game, in which participants play by rules and standards that have no
justification other than the fact that these rules were agreed upon. Dewey criticized early
modern empiricists for reducing experience to an impression from the outside, leaving the
subject passive and receptive. In a similar vein, Dewey would have argued with Rorty, who
reduced experience to an arbitrary form of linguistic practice. Hildebrand sees quite clearly
that Dewey’s conception of experience is richer than Rorty’s because it can account for
both the productive and the receptive aspects of experience (Hildebrand 2005). Hildebrand
cites Dewey from Experience and Nature: ‘‘Only upon reflective analysis does [experi-
ence] break up into external conditions…and internal structures.’’ Thus, experience, or the
resolution of its problematic quality, is not an independent, predetermined criterion for
successful inquiry.
Dewey precisely defines the indeterminate quality of changing situations as lacking
clear criteria, such as defined problems, goals, or performance measures. Such criteria must
8 A series of debates in the journal Administration and Society addressed the differences between classical
pragmatism and neo-pragmatism with reference to public administration and policy-making. See Shields
(2003, 2005), Miller (2004), Hickman (2004), Hildebrand (2005), etc.
Policy Sci (2010) 43:263–287 281
123
be creatively constructed and defined through the process of rational inquiry and delib-
eration. Alternative definitions of problems and solutions will have alternative success
criteria. In the earlier example of the alternative framing of the Americans with Disabilities
Act as either a transportation issue or as a civil rights issue, each policy option would have
had different success criteria e.g., related to efficiency of transportation or to the level of
social integration.
Experience poses a real, existential constraint to sensible definitions of problems and
effective solutions. The constraints and continuum of previous policy processes are an
inherent and integral part of the pragmatist concept of the rhythm of situations and the
continuum of experience. Further, although creating solidarity in the methods of inquiry
and deliberation may be a central concern in scientific and policy communities, it cannot
replace the quest for viable resolutions of problematic experience. A politically successful
argument, or consensus, may not solve the problem it seeks to address. Edelman’s (1977)
book, ‘‘Words that succeed and policies that fail,’’ suggests that this thinking is equivalent
to the expression ‘‘the operation was successful, but the patient died.’’ The ultimate test of
pragmatist rationality is in practice. The final result of rational agency should be con-
summated in experience, and not just in reflection or imagination as Dewey emphasizes:
There are however vices of reflection as well as of impulse. We may not look far
enough ahead because we are hurried into action by stress of impulse; but we may
also become over interested in the delights of reflection; we become afraid of
assuming the responsibilities of decisive choice and action. (Dewey 1922/2002,
p. 198)
Dewey defined the successful outcome of rational inquiry as achieving a working
harmony between diverse values, desires, and their anticipated consequences. The objec-
tive of inquiry is the directed transformation of a fragmented, indeterminate situation ‘‘into
a unified whole’’ (Dewey 1938/1999, p. 117). Dewey thus imbues the success of rational
inquiry with an aesthetic akin to the transcendental composite of ens, bonum, verum,
pulchritudum, unum; or of experience, ethics, science, and art that compose a unity.
Pragmatism does not consider this aesthetic unification as a deterministic or a natural end,
but as a possibility or potential that can be achieved through rational agency. People are
attuned to thinking about successful policy-making in this way when they comment on
‘‘elegant’’ policy solutions, or about how all the right pieces came together in policy
deliberations. As Dewey concluded: ‘‘Order, rhythm, and balance, simply means that
energies significant for experience are acting at their best’’ (Dewey 1934/1980, p. 192). ’’
Conclusion
The title of this article claimed: ‘‘there is no ‘point’ in decision-making.’’ In contrast to the
linear rational model (Fig. 1), the transactive rationality model (Fig. 3) shows that deci-
sion-making is not a fixed central point that separates pre-defined ends and inquiry phases
from subsequent implementation and evaluation phases. Definitions and decisions are
formed, and informed, throughout the policy process. Transactive rationality, like incre-
mentalism, recognizes that policy inquiry and deliberation occur within a continuum of
experience. Contrary to incrementalism, by integrating scientific and democratic inquiry
with moral imagination, transactive rationality supports integrative, visionary, and for-
ward-looking public policy and democratic projects. By addressing the scientific, demo-
cratic, moral, and ecological dimensions of rational agency, transactive rationality provides
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a more holistic, explanatory, and normative ‘‘fourth approach’’ to policy-making—beyond
‘‘linear’’ and ‘‘bounded’’ rationality, ‘‘incrementalism,’’ and ‘‘mixed scanning,’’ the
transactive rationality model, to meet the pragmatist standard of success, needs to be tested
and developed in both theory and practice.
This article contributes to a growing body of study that applies classical pragmatist
philosophy to the political and policy sciences and public administration. As Seigfried
observes, pragmatism’s greatest strengths are now being rediscovered:
These include early and persistent criticisms of positivist interpretations of scientific
methodology; disclosure of the value dimension of factual claims; reclaiming aes-
thetics as informing everyday experience; linking of dominant discourses with
domination; subordinating logical analysis to social, cultural, and political issues;
realigning theory with praxis. (Seigfried 1996, p. 21)
Contemporary studies indicate that pragmatist philosophy can better explain political and
economic behavior, rather than other related theories (Mousavi and Garrison 2003; Shook
2003). Pragmatist philosophy also offers an ecological perspective on policy-making that
emphasizes the interdependence of actors and environments (Alexander 2002; McDonald
2004). This is an important policy perspective given growing concerns for ecological sus-
tainability and security. With its emphasis on holism and equilibrium, and on learning and
progress, pragmatist philosophy is attuned with both Eastern and Western systems of thought, a
key policy consideration in this globalizing world (Grange and Ames 2004; Westbrook 1991).9
Evans argues that: ‘‘it would be not only possible, but also prudent, for the field of public
management to reclaim the philosophy of John Dewey as a guiding ethos for its practice’’.
One fundamental concern about pragmatist philosophy is whether it is overly optimistic
about individuals’ and societies’ capacities for rational deliberation (Bernstein 1998; Ryan
1995). Bernstein notes that such optimism indeed could be viewed as a fault, but
emphasizes that Dewey’s was a qualified optimism:
I do think that at times Dewey is excessively optimistic about the real social and
political possibilities of resolving serious social conflicts by open communication.
Although this is a weakness in Dewey’s thinking, we can read him in a different way.
For we can interpret Dewey as telling us that it is precisely because conflicts between
different groups run so deep, that it becomes all the more urgent to develop those
habits and virtues by which we can intelligently seek to negotiate and reconcile
differences. (Bernstein 1998, p. 149)
‘‘The problem of the public,’’ as Dewey himself admitted, is the essential need for
‘‘improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion’’
(Dewey 1954/1927, p. 208). The strong confluence of pragmatist philosophy and policy
science continues to channel inquiry into improving the methods of rational deliberation in
public policy and democratic practice.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
9 Dewey was influenced by his international work, and his philosophy is internationally recognized. He
worked not only in the U.S. and Europe, but also in Japan, Turkey, Mexico, South Africa, and Russia
(Schilpp and Hahn 1939/1989; Westbrook 1991; Ryan 1995). In China, he was even considered a ‘‘second
Confucius’’ (Grange and Ames 2004; Westbrook 1991).
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